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trial tactics

Beginning Testimony with
an Overview Witness
BY STEPHEN A. SALTZBURG

I

n a criminal case of any complexity, lawyers
are reasonably concerned about whether jurors will understand the evidence. Prosecutors may have an even greater concern than defense counsel in some cases because they bear a
heavy burden of proof, and confusion among jurors may make it more difficult for prosecutors to
prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There are
various ways that experienced lawyers endeavor
to make complicated matters more understandable to jurors. They use visual evidence, summary
charts of voluminous evidence under rules such
as Federal Rule of Evidence 1006, prepare transcripts to assist in comprehending recorded conversations, offer expert testimony to explain unfamiliar concepts and terms, and sometimes ask
trial judges to admit pedagogical summaries under rules like Federal Rule of Evidence 611(a) or
1006. In recent years, prosecutors have found the
use of an introductory witness to set forth an outline of their cases to be an effective advocacy tool.
Some courts have found it to be too effective.

An Illustrative Case

In United States v. Moore, 651 F.3d 30 (D.C. Cir.
2011), the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia reviewed the convictions of
six defendants who, along with others charged and
tried separately, were charged with conducting and
conspiring to conduct a drug distribution business
during the 1980s and 1990s in Washington, D.C.
The government alleged that the business involved
considerable violence, including 31 murders. The
trial lasted 10 months before the jury found the
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defendants guilty of the drug conspiracy, a RICO
conspiracy, and other crimes. The trial judge sentenced each of the defendants to prison terms that
were in excess of life imprisonment.

The Opening Witness

The defendants raised a host of issues on appeal,
but the one that is the focus here is the argument
that the defendants were unfairly prejudiced by
the prosecution’s calling an FBI agent to testify
as its first witness in order to provide an overview
of the government’s case-in-chief. The court observed that its “conclusions are not affected by
whether appellants’ challenge is viewed as a question of prosecutorial misconduct, as appellants
contend, or a claim of abuse of discretion by the
district court in admitting inadmissible evidence.”
(Id. at 55.)

The Only Circuit Precedent:
A Summary Witness

The court had not previously addressed the use
of an overview witness but had identified in United States v. Lemire, 720 F.2d 1327, 1348 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), the “obvious dangers posed by summarization of evidence” by a nonexpert witness
during the government’s case-in-chief. In Lemire,
the government called an FBI agent, who was a
certified public accountant, toward the end of its
case-in-chief to summarize the evidence about
the complex cash flow through offshore companies in a prosecution for wire fraud, interstate
transportation of the proceeds of fraud, and conspiracy. The agent used four summary charts to
organize the evidence already presented by the
government, and the charts identified the document in evidence from which each item of information was drawn. The defendant objected that
the agent lacked personal knowledge as required
by Federal Rule of Evidence 602, but the trial
judge admitted the agent’s testimony as “explanatory” rather than as “substantive” evidence.

Dangers and Advantages of
Summary Witnesses

The court of appeals affirmed in Lemire and
recognized “an established tradition” permitting summary evidence to be introduced along
with appropriate limiting instructions to the
jury. After noting that the evidence was cumulative and subject to challenge under Rule 403,
Lemire acknowledged that a nonexpert summary
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witness can help the jury organize and evaluate
complex factual evidence that is elicited in fragments through the testimony of many witnesses
throughout a trial.
The Lemire opinion strongly suggests that the
court was aware of the dangers of summary testimony as well as its advantages. The court concluded that the claim of unfair prejudice raised
more troubling concerns than the Rule 602 claim.
Lemire identified three obvious dangers posed
by summarization of evidence. First, there is a
danger that the jury might treat the summary
evidence as additional or corroborative evidence
that unfairly strengthens the government’s case.
Lemire indicated that cross-examination and limiting instructions could guard against this danger.
Second, summary witness testimony poses the
risk that otherwise inadmissible evidence might
be introduced. Lemire found that on the facts

(1st Cir. 2004) (citation omitted):
[S]uch testimony raises the very real specter
that the jury verdict could be influenced by
statements of fact or credibility assessments
in the overview but not in evidence. There
is also the possibility that later testimony
might be different than what the overview
witness assumed; objections could be sustained or the witness could change his or
her story. Overview testimony by government agents is especially problematic because juries may place greater weight on
evidence perceived to have the imprimatur
of the government.
(Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)
Moore was skeptical of the government argument
that an overview witness aids the jury by framing

The jury might treat the summary evidence as
additional or corroborative evidence that unfairly
strengthens the government’s case.
presented this was not much of a risk because
the trial participants heard the agent describe the
documents he reviewed to arrive at the summary
and thus were well situated to prevent reliance on
an erroneous or misleading summary.
Third, a summary witness might permit the
government to have more than one closing argument, because the witness might be doing just
what the prosecutor does in summation. Lemire
found that the agent made no controversial inferences and did not pronounce judgment, and
thus was not arguing the way a prosecutor would
argue in closing.

The Dangers of an Overview Witness

Lemire involved a witness whose testimony came
at the close of testimony, whereas Moore raised a
challenge to the use of an overview witness who
testifies at the outset of a case. The Moore court
observed that “[o]ther circuits to address the use
of overview witnesses have reached uniformly
negative conclusions in view of the serious dangers of prejudice to a fair trial. (Moore, 651 F.3d
at 56.) It quoted from the First Circuit’s opinion
in United States v. Casas, 356 F.3d 104, 119–20

how the government’s case will unfold, and quoted from the Second Circuit’s opinion in United
States v. Garcia, 413 F.3d 201, 214 (2d Cir. 2005):
“[T]he law already provides an adequate vehicle
for the government to ‘help’ the jury gain an overview of anticipated evidence as well as a preview
of its theory of each defendant’s culpability: the
opening statement.” (Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)
Moore noted that in its decision in United
States v. Smith, 640 F.3d 358, 367 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(citations omitted), it had “recently observed that
the First, Second, and Fifth Circuits ‘have viewed
agents’ hearsay-laden or hearsay-based overview
testimony at the onset of trial as a rather blatant prosecutorial attempt to circumvent hearsay
rules.’” (Moore, 651 F.3d at 57.)

The Testimony in Moore

The court found in Moore that all three dangers
identified by Lemire were present. In sum, the
court concluded as follows: “FBI Agent Sparks
testified about evidence not yet presented while
opining that the cooperating witnesses would
present truthful evidence because they were insiders and were guilty themselves, strengthening
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the government’s yet-to-be presented case and offering inadmissible evidence while providing the
government with a second opening argument.”
(Id. at 58.) The court offered examples of the
problems presented by Agent Sparks’s testimony:
For example, upon being shown a map of
the District of Columbia, FBI Agent Sparks
confirmed that the 31 circles located on the
map accurately reflected the locations of the
31 charged murders, and that murders clustered in certain locations occurred toward
the beginning of the charged conspiracy.
But no such evidence was before the jury and
FBI Agent Sparks did not purport to testify
from personal knowledge of each murder.
At other points, FBI Agent Sparks referred
to witness testimony that was never presented to the jury during the course of the
trial. In one exemplary circumstance, FBI
Agent Sparks testified on redirect examination that co-conspirator Erskine Hartwell
had described his role in the conspiracy as
supplying drugs and introducing Moore
and Gray to Oscar Veal. When asked by the
district court whether this information was
“based on what [Hartwell] told [him],” FBI
Agent Sparks agreed, prompting the district
court to state: “The jury is going to hear his
testimony.” Yet when asked only moments
later by the prosecutor “if Erskine Hartwell
will be a witness in this case or not,” FBI
Agent Sparks replied that he “d[idn’t] know
for sure if [Hartwell] will.” From portions
of the transcript submitted by the parties to
this court, there is no indication that Hartwell testified at trial and hence “later testimony . . . differe[d] [from] what the overview
witness assumed.”
(Id. at 58–59 (alterations in the original) (citations
omitted).)

ating co-conspirator witnesses nonetheless
know what’s going on, they have the information, they’re the eyewitnesses, earwitnesses, they hear what these guys are
talking about after they commit a murder, they witness a murder, they know
where the stash locations are for drugs. . . .
[T]hey are present when drug deals are
done. They have been with these people
day in and day out, and you need that
kind of testimony. That’s the only way to
put these kind[s] of cases together.
He also testified that the goal in a debriefing
session was to “[g]et[ ] complete and truthful information” and that it was important
to “try and verify” the information “[j]ust to
make sure the person is truthful, that they
are complete.” On redirect examination,
FBI Agent Sparks reinforced the notion
that the cooperating witnesses were guilty
of committing crimes in their capacity as
the defendants’ co-conspirators:
Q: You were asked a lot of questions on
cross-examination about cooperating
witnesses, and you continually referred to
them as criminals.
A: Yes.
Q: Any doubt in your mind about that?
A: None whatsoever.
(Id. at 59 (alterations in the original) (citations
omitted).)

Going Forward

The court offered another example of testimony
by Agent Sparks that it found disturbing:

In Moore, the D.C. Circuit joined other circuits in
“condemning the practice” of having the government begin a criminal case with an overview witness. Despite the discretion afforded trial judges
to control the mode and order of proof, the court
concluded that a trial judge would have difficulty
assuring that an overview witness does not provide the government with an unfair advantage:

[H]e testified that it was important, in his
view, to use cooperating witnesses in this
case because it was “the only way” to gain
“access to the inside information.” Acknowledging that cooperating witnesses
were “themselves . . . criminals[,] unfortunately,” he further testified that the cooper-

The use of overview witnesses exacerbates
the “obvious dangers” this court identified
in Lemire in the use of non-expert summarization evidence. Overview testimony offers
an opportunity to “poison the jury’s mind
against the defendant or to recite items of
highly questionable evidence.” Avoidance of
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those dangers is largely beyond the ability
of the district court, much less the defense,
to prevent. As the record here demonstrates,
a trained law enforcement officer is likely to
go as far as the questions allow, presenting
a picture for the jury of a solid prosecution
case based on his opinion of the strength
and credibility of the witnesses the government plans to call to testify at trial for reasons made persuasive in view of the officer’s
training and experience.
(Id. at 60 (citation omitted).)
The Moore court clearly stated that “[t]he government remains free to call as its first witness a
law enforcement officer who is familiar with the
pre-indictment investigation or was otherwise
personally involved, where permissible under the
Rules of Evidence and consistent with constitutional guarantees,” and “[s]uch a witness may, for
example, be able to provide relevant background
information as to the investigation’s duration and
scope or the methods of surveillance, based on
personal knowledge.” (Id.) The court indicated
that FBI Agent Sparks “could properly describe,
based on his personal knowledge, how the gang
investigation in this case was initiated, what law
enforcement entities were involved, and what investigative techniques were used,” but “he could
not . . . present lay opinion testimony about investigative techniques in general and opine on what
generally works and what does not, as illustrated
by informants who pled guilty” and could not “anticipate evidence that the government would hope
to introduce at trial about the charged offenses or
express an opinion, directly or indirectly, about the
strength of that evidence or the credibility of any
of the government’s potential witnesses, including
the cooperating co-conspirators.” (Id. at 61.)

Harmless Error

Despite its harsh criticism of Agent Sparks’s overview testimony, Moore held that it did not prejudice the defendants for several reasons. The testimony identified by the defendants as problematic
on appeal was all confirmed by trial testimony.
The defense was focused on cross-examining testifying co-conspirators and other government witnesses, and the trial judge instructed the jury at
the conclusion of Sparks’s testimony to disregard

any opinions he offered. Most importantly, perhaps, there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.

Lessons

1. Moore is not the first appellate opinion to
discuss the dangers of overview testimony. The
fact that a number of courts have criticized such
testimony should put prosecutors on notice that a
conviction may be at risk if they utilize an overview witness, especially in jurisdictions where an
appellate court has criticized the practice.
2. Moore provides defense counsel who share the
Moore court’s concern about the use of overview
witnesses a summary of the dangers that can be
cited in support of an objection to such testimony.
3. The use of an overview witness early in a case
poses more problems than the use of a summary
witness later in a case (although both uses pose
risks), because late in a case the parties and the
court are able to compare the summary witness’s
testimony with the evidence already presented
and to object to variances or improper lay opinions about that evidence. Early in a case, it is more
difficult to know whether the overview witness’s
testimony will be entirely consistent with evidence
not yet presented and/or whether a lay opinion is
supported by sufficient personal knowledge.
4. In sum, the prosecution, the defense, and the
trial court share an interest in avoiding the use of
overview witnesses, for as Moore observed, “[t]his
court now having made clear the exacerbated ‘obvious dangers’ of the overview witness testifying
about evidence yet to be admitted before the jury
affords all parties clear direction to avoid unnecessary risks—for the prosecutor of an overturned
conviction, for the defense of an unfair trial, and
for the district court of having to retry a case.” (Id.
at 61.)
5. Forgoing the use of an overview witness ought
not to leave government lawyers feeling that they
will not have an adequate opportunity to explain
complex cases. As Moore reminds, “this court’s
long-held view of the purpose of the opening statement to the jury, namely to allow the prosecutor
the opportunity to provide the jury with an objective overview of the evidence that the government
intends to introduce at trial, has long afforded the
prosecutor the opportunity to do that for which the
prosecutor improperly used FBI Agent Sparks.” (Id.
(citations omitted).) n
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